Last night I went to bed
reasonably certain that Israel was headed to a ground operation in Gaza.
It seemed fairly inevitable:
Hamas's response to our demand for
quiet was a barrage of rockets, a barrage that continues off and on even as I
write, and which has brought injuries and trauma and destruction of
property.
What is more, Hamas demanded
conditions for a ceasefire -- such as Israel's cessation of the sea blockade
--that were totally unacceptable and were rejected out of hand by
Netanyahu. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri then announced that cease
fire negotiations with Israel had failed.
It seemed fairly obvious at that
point that Hamas wasn't looking for a cease fire. And the ground operation
seemed inevitable.
~~~~~~~~~~
Today the situation has shifted,
at least tentatively. Some sort of negotiations, brokered by Egypt, are
taking place. Reports vary as to what is being demanded on each side. But
from the Israeli side, it seems to be something like this:
[] A long term period of quiet.
How long? According to YNet (and only YNet from what I've
seen), more than 15 years. This means a total cessation of rocket fire and
total cessation of attacks on IDF personnel.
[] Cessation of arms smuggling and
transfer of weapons to Gaza.
[] Permanent closing of all
crossings into Gaza from Israel, coupled with the permanent opening of the Rafah
crossing from Egypt into Gaza.
[] Granting of Israel the right to
hunt down terrorists if there has been an attack or intelligence about an
imminent attack. (This is a right Hamas had sought to deny Israel in their
original stipulations.)
[] The political echelon of Egypt
and particularly Morsi would be the guarantors of the agreement.
~~~~~~~~~~
We must keep in mind that
Israel wasn't reporting these specifics -- they came out of
Cairo. Yet, there was
likely some truth to what was being reported. And I was left
wondering if everyone had gone daft:
No matter how formal and public an
agreement was reached with Hamas, sanctioned and guaranteed by no matter how
many nations -- the terms reportedly being demanded would not
be viable. Quite simply, there is no way that Hamas will keep the
quiet for more than 15 years or seven years or eight years because it has
formally agreed or pledged to do so, and, similarly no way that it will
refrain from all weapon smuggling because of a commitment to refrain.
We can begin with the
obvious -- that the radical Islamist ideology of Hamas, which is
committed to Israel's destruction, would not be predisposed to long term
quiet. But there is more.
It is a point of Islamic faith --
a behavior modeled directly after Mohammad: truces with non-Muslim enemies are
made with the intention of breaking them as soon as the Muslim nation or group
has the necessary strength to overcome its adversary. That makes smuggling
of weapons something of a necessity. And as to sustaining quiet for more
than fifteen years? Such truces are never to be more than ten, if that,
depending on circumstances.
~~~~~~~~~~
For those interested in knowing
more, the behavior of Mohammad in this regard was connected to the Treaty of
al-Hudaybiyya in the seventh century.
Denis MacEoin describes it
here: http://www.meforum.org/1925/tactical-hudna-and-islamist-intolerance . The term in Arabic used in this regard is
hudna or ceasefire. Says MacEoin, the word "retains a historical
context that colors its meaning, if not in Western papers, then in Arabs'
understanding....
"Hudna, in other
words, amounted to a temporary truce...Over the course of history,
hudna became the standard term to describe a cessation of hostilities
during jihad... (emphasis added)
"Can Western governments do
anything to prevent a new hudna running its usual course? Diplomats may
propose carrot and stick strategies, offering financial and political incentives
to dismantle the culture of violence with disincentives for any return to
killing. In the end, though, the onus is on the Palestinians and their
allies..."
(For the record, a hudna
has terms, a formality, while an informal quiet is called a
tahadiya,)
~~~~~~~~~~
So much then for Hamas. What of
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in charge in Egypt? Morsi, quite simply
does not have the capacity to control Hamas and guarantee a ceasefire and
cessation of smuggling of weapons for a considerable number of years.
He cannot even control the Sinai
and the al-Qaeda terrorists there. Remember how much was made of Egyptian
forces going into the Sinai to eliminate the terrorists? It got very quiet
after the initial publicity: the effort dissipated
without succeeding. And he's going to make sure Hamas behaves?
The fact is that Morsi had sought
Hamas's help in fingering certain members of al-Qaeda with regard to the
murdering of soldiers in the Sinai, and Hamas would not cooperate.
Al-Qaeda has now moved into Cairo,
and goes back and forth between the Sinai and Gaza, facilitating the transfer of
weapons and otherwise promoting radical unrest.
Morsi is powerless.
~~~~~~~~~~
He is powerless with regard to his
ability to control Hamas. But in terms of his own radical ideology, he
would not have the will to stop Hamas from inflicting damage on
Israel. He cannot even bring himself to say "Israel" at a press
conference.
~~~~~~~~~~
At least in theory, Israel has
given Hamas 36 hours -- which runs until tomorrow evening. If Hamas has
not accepted Israel's terms, then a ground operation may follow.
I suspect, however, that if something serious were in process, then it
would go longer.
~~~~~~~~~~
What I want to provide for you
here, then, is an overview of the factors that may be affecting or
motivating the parties concerned. In order to do so more effectively,
I have consulted today with some ME experts, Israeli
academics/journalists who are Arabic speaking and in touch with what is going
on.
~~~~~~~~~~
Israel is not so foolish as to
imagine that Hamas will honor a long term cease fire and that Morsi will
guarantee it. There is consensus on the fact that this is nonsense.
At the end of the day. it is not a
ceasefire agreement or an Egyptian guarantee that will ensure
quiet. It is what is commonly referred to as deterrence power: Hamas has
to be afraid of Israel. Hamas leaders have to be convinced they may get
their heads blown off if they move in the wrong direction. Or that they
will be so badly damaged that it's not worth it. (Hezbollah
harbors some of this fear now, by the way.)
The question, then, it seems to me
is, when is it enough? When has enough damage been inflicted on Hamas
so that fear has been instilled in their hearts and they'll think twice about
hitting us again? My own personal take is that it's not enough
yet. That still more is required -- whether in terms of escalated air
attacks or the ground operation.
~~~~~~~~~~
There is talk about "finishing the
job" if we do go in. And indeed, Olmert pulled the troops out of Gaza too
fast with Cast Lead, at the end of 2008 and early 2009. But how would
Israel determine when the ground operation had met its
objectives? When Hamas communications centers and major
infrastructure have been leveled and most rocket storage sites have been
hit or dismantled? When a certain percentage of the leadership has been
"eliminated"?
The problem is this: We want Hamas
on its knees -- weakened sufficiently so that they are ready to revise their
current tactics. But we do not want Hamas destroyed. The simple
reason: In the absence of Hamas a situation is very likely to evolve that
would bring us even bigger headaches.
A delicate balance then.
For neither do we want to take
over Gaza completely. Attempting this would drag us into a quagmire of
considerable proportions and cost a good many Israeli lives. This is not
something that is on the table or being even remotely considered. It is
some sort of a romantic dream that we can march in there and just take
over. Not with what's going on in Gaza today.
We want only to contain Hamas and
protect our citizens.
~~~~~~~~~~
I know that the IDF is ready and
eager to move. But whether they do or not is a political and not a
military decision in a democracy. I had it from a good source today that
it would probably also be PM Netanyahu's preference to have the IDF move in and
hit Hamas harder.
I'm not going to second guess our
prime minister with regard to the decisions he ultimately makes here. I
would not want to be in his shoes. For there are a host of factors to be
considered.
It's difficult to imagine that he
believes that sufficient deterrence has already been achieved -- because
they are still shooting at us and still taking hits from our Air Force. So then,
why hasn't he ordered the ground operation to begin, and why has he made some
proposals towards a ceasefire?
~~~~~~~~~~
I wrote the other day about how
the world does not like to see us, as Jews, defend ourselves when it means
killing others. It's not the fact that others are dying that matters to
the world (for they don't care about the thousands of Syrian dead), it is that
we are causing those deaths. This is
simply unacceptable to the international community, never mind their lip
service to our right to defend ourselves. This is the ugly
reality.
~~~~~~~~~~
Yesterday, I said we were going to
be under a good deal of international pressure. That pressure now exceeds
what I had expected, which was quiet diplomacy. They don't leave us alone.
Tony Blair talks about the Quartet
acting to bring "quiet." Heaven help us.
And Obama said it would be
"preferable" if a solution could be found "without a ramping-up of military
activity in Gaza."
Perhaps worst was the statement
yesterday to SkyNews of UK Foreign Secretary William Hague:
"A ground invasion is much more
difficult for the international community to sympathize with or support —
including the United Kingdom."
~~~~~~~~~~
Minister of Security Affairs Moshe
Yaalon responded with anger to this:
"We expect our allies to support
us [when we] use all tools available in order to defend our people. To say the
least, we don’t like these kinds of reservations...Regarding a ground operation,
we feel like we should have the freedom of operation in order to be able to
defend our country without any reservations..."
Yaalon was on the mark. But
does this incessant pressure not take a toll?
There are two ways of thinking
about this. Perhaps the Israeli government has decided to be more
circumspect in its decisions, because of repercussions that might follow.
I cannot swear that this is not so.
But there is another possibility,
which would be very much in line with how Netanyahu often acts: He plays the
game. Perhaps (this is speculation), he made the cease fire proposal to
Hamas to show the international community how hard he is trying to avoid going
into Gaza. Perhaps he fully expects that it won't be accepted, and that he
can then order troops into Gaza, having at least partially silenced the likes of
Hague.
~~~~~~~~~~
But there is also another reason
Netanyahu may have made the proposal he did: it thrusts responsibility for Gaza
on Egypt. Closing all of the crossings into Gaza from Israel means no more
goods going through via Israel, no more squabbles with UNRWA, etc. etc. That
would all fall to Egypt via Rafah, which would stay open.
~~~~~~~~~~
One of my contacts today explained
that it is because Israel definitely does not trust Egypt to stop the
smuggling of Iranian weapons into Gaza that the munitions plant in Sudan was
hit. The goal is to interrupt the pipeline before the material reaches the
Sinai.
~~~~~~~~~~
Morsi? He comes to this
situation as a beggar. Egypt is on the verge of bankruptcy and he is in
the position of not being able to feed his people. He fears the
possibility of riots in the street by hungry people. That would end him
quickly.
And so he is playing a game,
acting the conciliator, the negotiator, at Obama's behest. For Obama will
provide him with the money that will save him. (I am tempted to ask if
Obama is so naive, so poorly informed, as to imagine that Morsi can control the
situation -- but I won't go there now.)
Does Morsi want to restrain Hamas
long term? Does he remotely imagine that he can? Nah...
But he is not interested right now
in promoting actions that reflect ideology -- he's too busy trying to save his
country. And what seems to be the case is that he's ready to let
tomorrow take care of itself.
~~~~~~~~~~
Hamas, until today, was continuing
the rocket launchings and subverting the cease fire proposal because of
Iran. Iran did not want to see a cease fire. I had rather surmised this,
but it has been confirmed by one of my experts
today.
But -- surprise! -- Iran has now
reversed itself and told Hamas to negotiate. Why? I was advised today that
it is because the Iranians have decided they can get something
from Morsi. They won't stand in the way of his achievement in
successfully negotiating a cease fire (which achievement he badly
needs, if indeed it will happen). In return they are seeking a shift
in Morsi's position in Syria. The Iranians are not happy that Muslim Brotherhood
has worked against their client Assad, and they want more Egyptian support for
him.
~~~~~~~~~~
Did I not say this
situation was convoluted? What we learn from this, if nothing else,
is that there is always so very much under the surface. By studying only
surfaces, we cannot imagine that we comprehend the situation.
I have no answers. My
crystal ball is as foggy as ever. We will have to wait to see how
this plays out. What I hope is that I have provided some assistance
in grappling with an understanding this situation.
~~~~~~~~~~
©
Arlene Kushner. This material is produced by Arlene Kushner,
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