Eyes on the ball, folks. In strategic terms, the most important
thing that has happened in the last 10 days is that Mohammed Morsi has assumed dictatorial powers in
Egypt.
Courageous Egyptians are protesting that move, but Morsi has less compunction than
Mubarak did, and we can expect the protests to be dealt with
effectively.
So, those of us who said Morsi was an
Islamist extremist who would quickly reestablish authoritarianism in Egypt –
with a sharia flavor – were right.
Those who said Morsi was a moderate were wrong.
And his Napoleonic self-crowning
event changes the calculus for Gaza and Hamas, among other things. The universal interpretation of the ceasefire brokered by
Egypt this
week puts the responsibility for preventing attacks by Hamas against Israel
squarely on the Morsi government.
(Not all analyses refer to “frantic” diplomacy on the part of the United
States.) Far from making Egypt
anyone’s partner in repressing Hamas,
this move effectively hands Hamas over to Morsi – and with Hamas, the Gaza
Strip.
Hamas is a terrorist group whose
independence of him is an inconvenience for Morsi. Hamas is the finger of Iran in the
Levantine “pie” situated on Morsi’s northeastern border. Hamas lies between Morsi and
Jerusalem. Morsi is not going to
“work with” Hamas; he is going to give Hamas the choice to work with him, or be
rendered insignificant.
Hamas can be useful to Morsi, if
that’s what its leaders choose to do.
There may or may not be a “break” with Iran; it would probably be better
from Morsi’s perspective to keep Iran on a string with Hamas, and prevent a
divergence of objectives – i.e., between Egypt and Iran – for as long as
possible.
But do not be deceived. Iran has just taken a big strategic hit
from the terms of the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire. Iran may still have Qods Force
operatives in the area, but Morsi has established a veto over Iran’s activities
there. There may be a few more
attempts by Hamas at independence from Morsi – although frankly, I doubt it –
but the die is cast: what happens from now on will happen on Morsi’s timeline
and his say-so.
That, at least, is what he
intends. He has been rather
transparent in the last few days.
Immediately upon getting the
ceasefire on terms advantageous for his intentions, he declared himself
all-powerful in Egypt. This was not
a coincidence. His pursuit of the
ceasefire was part and parcel of his overall planning. He was happy to accept the vaguest of
commitments on Israel’s side, as long as the understanding was that Egypt would
guarantee Hamas’s behavior. That
was the prize Morsi sought.
Now he has started clearing the way
to make good use of that prize.
Morsi is on the move. He is
moving very quickly to consolidate power, and position Egypt as a force to be
reckoned with in the “race to Jerusalem.” No longer a sleepy,
despotic backwater, Egypt is now ready to play on the same field as Iran and
Turkey. We can expect Morsi to play
off Turkey and Iran, remaining on good terms with both as he will seek to do
with the US and Europe. It won’t be
time for a “break” with anyone until Morsi has acquired an advantageous position
for inducing the fall of Jerusalem – the denouement sought eagerly by the Muslim
Brotherhood, and hollered about often by Morsi himself.
In the near future, Morsi may well be
able to keep Hamas in check in Gaza, a condition that might make some Israelis
and Americans complacent about the turn of events. I think we’ll know in the next month
whether Hamas and Iran will try to restore the status quo ante, by recovering
strategic independence from Egypt.
If they wait longer than that, their opportunity will have passed them
by. My guess is that they won’t
make the attempt, however, and that Morsi has established himself as a new fact
of the geopolitical landscape.
This will not have the effect of
making him more moderate or conventional.
It can be said, meanwhile, that his ascent could not have happened, and
certainly not so quickly, without the assistance of the United States. At each step along the way, the US could
have shown the kinds of useful leadership that we simply have not shown since
the beginning of the Arab Spring.
Part of having regional partnerships
is caring what happens to your partners, and besides Israel, the US had
longstanding ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, and
Morocco, and newer but very productive relationships with Iraq, Qatar, UAE, and
Oman. Until Morsi was elected this
summer, there was no inevitability about a despotic Islamist tendency from the
Arab Spring. If we date it to June
2009, however, with the Green Revolution in Iran, the Obama administration’s
record of untimely passivity regarding both human rights and geopolitical
outcomes goes back three and a half years.
Morsi now has no reason to suppose that American objections to his power
grab will matter.
Saudi Arabia has a lot to think
about. The Middle East already sees
that the Palestinian statehood bid is an outdated
gambit. The players are out of position: Fatah,
with its US and European money and long ties to Saudi Arabia, is not the right
scion of Islamism to have in charge of the West Bank. Its whole enterprise is a relic of a
different time. Fatah, like Hamas,
will have to adapt to the new reality.
But can the Saudis adapt?
And Jordan?
I don’t think Mahmoud Abbas wants to
be Morsi’s boy. But although
Abbas’s patrons haven’t dropped him, their patronage suddenly matters a lot
less. This was inevitable when
Obama was reelected; that it has happened so soon is the point of interest. Benjamin Netanyahu may have
been under pressure from the US when he accepted the
ceasefire, and may have seen the need for a time-out to regroup. But what they’re regrouping for on the
other side of the fence is a
game-changer. Next time, it won’t
be “Cast Lead Part II.” There’s a
new Pharoah in town, and he’s on the move.
Thanks LM
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