"A great wind is coming," in the words of one of Israel's founding paratroopers, Yoel Palgi.
For a long time,
perhaps too long, the government chose a policy of restraint, known as
"containment" in modern parlance, absorbed the rocket fire toward
Israeli communities bordering the Gaza Strip and tried each time to
restore the calm by reaching an agreement with Hamas. Until it was
pushed, and then pushed a little further.
When the safety pin was
finally switched off and the fighter jets took off, a sigh of relief
could be heard across the country which in essence expressed the
feeling: It's about time.
At sporting events the
crowd rises to its feet and sings the national anthem without requiring
instruction. Those called to emergency reserve duty — many of them from
homes in range of the rocket attacks — report with the sense that they
are being drafted to defend the country.
The common sense of
purpose is absolute. Solidarity in Israel is almost across the board.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and IDF
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz haven't lost control. Operation
Pillar of Defense is going as planned, both through the expansion of the
air force's targets in Gaza and through the dramatically exceptional
protection of civilians. If the residents on the fourth floor of the old
apartment building in Kiryat Malachi would only have left their
apartment as instructed, the number of Israeli deaths would be zero.
Regardless of the painful and regrettable loss of life, the achievement
has still been remarkable.
But where are we
headed? How much force should we use and why? Everything that has
happened thus far was planned beforehand. The possibility that a ground
invasion would be required was taken into account, but after the
Goldstone report the assumption in Israel was that it would be allowed
to apply less force than during Operation Cast Lead four years ago. In
other words, there would either be a reduction of the effectiveness of
ground forces or an increased risk to the combat troops.
The calling up of
75,000 reserve troops, according to Israel's leadership, can be
interpreted in two ways by the other side. One, that the mere
possibility of seeing Israeli tanks on the streets of Gaza will deter
Hamas, or two, that Hamas' leaders will not compromise until they
actually see the tanks with their own eyes. Hamas hopes its
intransigence will force Egypt to intervene, or at least to cancel its
peace treaty with Israel.
Israel wants to avoid a
ground offensive. Netanyahu and Barak are proponents of the surgical
strike approach, as opposed to a wide-scale operation. However, for them
to avoid the need to expand the operation, Israel must truly and
earnestly prepare for it. He who desires surgical strikes must be
prepared for all-out war.
But how would that
unfold? Would it take the form of a gradual escalation of fighting or a
giant attack that aims to land a "knockout" blow? There is no need to
peruse the protocols from the "Forum of Three" (Netanyahu, Barak and
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman) meeting Saturday night to understand
their misgivings.
Hamas is bartering with
Egypt and other Arab states over the wording of a deal to be offered to
Israel. It is feigning satisfaction with the results of the fighting.
This is what it says publicly, to the media. In actuality, Hamas has
been hit hard, but the Israeli leadership is debating whether Hamas
indeed feels defeated when the casualty numbers in the Gaza Strip are so
low, relatively.
Omer Bar-Lev, the
former commander of the IDF's elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit and a
current candidate on the Labor party's list of Knesset candidates, on
Friday recommended implementing a 12-hour cease fire. If Hamas continues
fighting, the IDF will intensify its attacks. If it doesn't, everything
will be over and peace will be restored. This short time period could
make the difference between the surgical strikes and a ground invasion,
and lead to an arrangement to stop shooting for a year or two.
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